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Security is increasingly viewed as a key condition for 
economic growth and development. The authors argue 
that the work and impact of all development partners 
would be enhanced if the multiple linkages between 
public finance, security, and development were explicitly 
taken into account. At the extreme, in some cases better 
public finance management could have more impact on 
security than would more troops. The paper first outlines 
three core linkages between security and development—
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development 
Department of the South Asia Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to understand the broader context and 
implications of public finances in a conflict-affected country like Afghanistan. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at wbyrd@worldbank.org and sguimbert@
worldbank.org. 
through the investment climate, human and social 
capital, and institutions. The authors then propose three 
complementary tools to analyze the security sector from 
the point of view of public finance management, service 
delivery, and governance. This conceptual framework is 
applied to the case of Afghanistan. The paper closes by 
drawing some conclusions about possible entry points for 
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1 The analysis in this paper was initiated as part of the World Bank’s Public Finance Management Review for 
Afghanistan (World Bank 2005b).  Nicole Ball, Peter Middlebrook, and Christopher Ward contributed to Volume V of 
that report (“Improving Public Financial Management in the Security Sector”).  See Manthri (2008) and Byrd et al 
(2008) for recent analyses of fiscal aspects of the security sector in Afghanistan.  Very useful comments by Nicole Ball 
on an earlier draft of this paper are gratefully acknowledged.  However, responsibility for any errors or inaccuracies, as 
well as for the views, findings, and conclusions expressed in this paper, rests solely with the authors. 1. Introduction 
It has been estimated that more than 800,000 people around the world lose their lives to 
lethal violence every year.  Almost one-third of all developing countries are considered to be 
at risk of violent conflict or in a state of chronic instability.  Private firms report that they 
pay up to 15% of their sales revenue to protect themselves from insecurity.
2 
Over the years, there has been a growing recognition on the part of the development 
community of the importance of conflict and insecurity, and on the positive side of the 
linkages between security and development.  This is a significant departure from a more 
traditional approach, where institutions in charge of development (national and international, 
bilateral and multilateral) refrained from any involvement with security issues.  This shift 
started in the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, and reflected the following insights. 
First, armed conflicts are a major source of economic downturns, increasing poverty, and 
human and social distress (World Bank, 2003a, Chapter 1).  Security plays a major role in 
breaking the conflict trap.  Second, the rule of law has been repeatedly highlighted as a core 
driver of economic development (World Bank, 2004).  “Securing” property rights is an 
important driver of development as emphasized by Hernando de Soto (2000).  Criminality 
can be a severe disincentive to entrepreneurship and investment.  Conflict and criminality 
can be linked, as crime can be fostered by conflict and, when pervasive, crime may also fuel 
wider conflict.  As noted in Chalmers (2005, p. 7), “The relationships between socio-
economic governance, conflict, and growth are multi-directional, with poor governance and 
conflict reinforcing each other, and both phenomena undermining the possibilities for 
economic development.”  Third, a holistic definition of poverty encompasses the notion of 
empowerment, a basic requirement for which is that citizens feel safe (World Bank, 2000).  
Poor security reduces the ability of citizens to live freely and to be engaged in their society.  
These linkages between security and development are explored further in Section 2. 
Recent analysis emphasizes the importance of institutions for achieving all key development 
objectives, including the role of an effective Public Finance Management (PFM) system 
(Acemoglu et al, 2005, and PEFA, 2005).  This paper at its core reflects the view that good 
public finance management is a necessary condition also for security.  For example, Ghani 
and Lockhart (2006) argue that “a sustained analysis by NATO of the best means of 
achieving security in Afghanistan showed that credible institutions and public finance would 
contribute more to security than would the deployment of troops.”  Among the important 
PFM issues considered in this paper is the fact that the security sector needs public resources 
and hence has to be considered in relation to trade-offs with other development objectives.  
Also important is the role of due processes, transparency, and accountability, as in other 
sectors.  And the complex relationship between security and governance is discussed. 
There is growing research linking security, security sector reform, and development.  The 
World Bank organized its 2005 ABCDE conference around the theme of “securing 
development in an unstable world” (cf. www.worldbank.org/abcde).  The International 
Peace Academy has had a “Security-Development Nexus Program” conducting research in 
this area (see Tschirgi, 2005).  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released a 
                                                 
2 Commission on Human Security (2003) for number of deaths; Tschirgi (2005) for states in conflict or at risk; World 
Bank (2004) for cost of insecurity. 
   2report on crime and development in Africa (UNODC, 2005).  The UK Government’s 
Department for International Development (DFID, 1999 and 2005) has prepared a 
document entitled “Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: a Strategy for Security and 
Development” (2005).  The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD also has 
issued guidelines on the security-development nexus.  USAID (2002), Canada, and others 
have released policy papers dealing with this same issue as well.  Duncan and Pollard (2002) 
also view social order as an important precondition for growth and poverty reduction, 
whereas Dixit (2004) provides some counter-arguments, putting forward situations where 
economic activity can prosper despite “lawlessness”. 
Discussions of security and public finance management are much less common.  Notable 
exceptions include Ball (1988) and Ball and Holmes (2002), the latter with a specific focus on 
defense.  Roberts (2007) is concerned with transparency in the security sector.  At the 
country level, these approaches have only very rarely been used in analytical work.  The case 
of Afghanistan is dealt with in detail in World Bank (2005b, notably in Volume V). 
In Section 2 of this paper, we synthesize key linkages between security and development.  
Based on this framework, we then apply three standard public finance tools to the security 
sector.  The central message is that, by and large, these frameworks are very useful for 
analysis and policy recommendations for the security sector just as they are for other sectors, 
effectively undermining the common claim that the security sector is special and cannot be 
assessed like any other sector.  Section 3 builds on the three core principles of public 
finance—fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency—to draw lessons 
for the security sector.  Section 4 explores the concept of security as a public service to be 
delivered to the population and assesses the implications of a service delivery model for the 
security sector.  Section 5 reviews the implications of various public finance management 
and governance issues for the security sector.  Section 6 applies these frameworks to the case 
of Afghanistan, and Section 7 concludes the paper by discussing possible entry points for 
dialogue on the security sector from a public finance and development perspective. 
2. Insecurity as a Constraint to Growth and Development 
In this section, we propose a conceptual framework to explore the relationships between 
security and development.  We first define the notion of security.  The importance of 
security is typically most evident when it is absent, so security has often been defined in 
contrast to its opposite, insecurity.  From a more positive perspective, the OECD’s 
Development Advisory Committee (DAC) defines security as a development objective in the 
following way: “Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which 
people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance 
of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and 
the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their 
health and well-being.  The security of people and the security of states are mutually 
reinforcing.  A wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for 
ensuring some aspect of security.”  (OECD, 2005b, pp. 20-21).  This definition is consistent 
with the broad concept of “human security” used by the UN.   
   3For analytical purposes, we focus on a well-defined set of issues that can be defined by the 
functions or by the risks covered by our analysis.
3  We approach security in terms of risks, 
including (Table 1): physical (risk of death or injuries); social (e.g. crime); or political (e.g. 
coup d’etat).  The implications of these risks also differ depending on whether they occur 
mainly at the individual/household (micro), local/regional (meso), or national (macro) level. 
Table 1: Main Types and Levels of Security-Related Risks (Some Examples)  









Social  Crime 
Domestic violence 
Terrorism 




Political  Ethnic and other 
discrimination 
Riots  Political default on social 
programs 
Coup d’état 
Source: Based on Holzmann and Jørgensen (2000), which also includes other risks (e.g. natural and economic risks). 
The question is then how to manage these security-related risks.  In this context of risk 
management, the framework developed in the seminal work of Holzmann and Jørgensen 
(2000) can be used.  A fruitful distinction in this framework is between risk reduction 
(reducing the probability of a downside risk), mitigation (reducing the impact of a future 
downside risk), and coping (relieving the impact of a risk after it has materialized).  This 
highlights that risks have a direct impact (for example, destruction of irrigation systems 
during a war has a direct cost in terms of reduced economic activity and loss of economic 
assets), an indirect impact due to coping strategies (e.g. selling livestock to cope with the 
economic loss, or leaving the country), and an indirect impact due to ex-ante risk reduction 
or mitigation measures (e.g. reducing irrigation investment due to fear of losing such assets).  
Importantly, these three impacts have both static (e.g. loss of life today) and dynamic (e.g. 
reduced human capital in the future) effects. 
We posit that these various impacts can be summarized around three main channels, which 
encompass key drivers of growth and development: investment climate, human and social 
capital, and public institutions (see Aghion and Durlauf, 2005).  From the Holzmann and 
Jørgensen framework, we can see that security-related risks have an impact on growth and 
development not only directly, but also through the way individuals, communities, and firms 
respond ex post when risks materialize (coping strategy) and ex ante to reduce the likelihood 
or magnitude of these shocks (Table 2).  In this section, we review the key transmission links 
at play for each channel and suggest ways to assess their importance in a given country.  
 
                                                 
3 Although we are trying to provide a holistic view of the security – development nexus, some linkages are excluded.  
First, we do not consider the global level, which has received much attention after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.  Second, and related, we are focusing on policy implications at the national level, not on international institutions 
or cooperation.  Also, our focus is on developing countries.  Finally, we do not consider some of the impacts of poor 
security on development more broadly defined, for instance on environment, migration, and youth. 
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Materialization of 
Security-Related Risks 
Direct Costs  Costs of Coping 
Strategies 
Costs of Reduction / 
Mitigation Strategies 
Investment Climate 








Weaker human and social 
capital and institutions 
 





















Fiscal cost of security 
sector; risk-adverse 
investment behavior; 
protection costs; capital 
flight, weak FDI; shift 
toward informal sector 
Reliance on informal 
trade networks; adverse 
to trade-related sectors 
[see below] 




Forced displacement, large 
numbers of combatants 
Loss of jobs, assets, income 
 
 
Financing of security sector, 
destruction of health / 
education infrastructure 
 
Loss of human and 
social capital 
 
Loss of social capital 
and skills 
Difficulty to smooth 
consumption 
 
Reduced provision of 








Sale of productive assets; 
shift to illegal activities 
 
Resources required for 
reconstruction (possibly 
resulting in excessive 
taxes or deficit financing 
and inflation); poor 
quality of alternative 
mechanisms for 
providing social services 
 
Brain flight, migration 
 
 





(including in the form of 
capital flight) 
Public Institutions 
Weak revenue base 
 
 

























Encourage private deals 
with corrupt officials 
 
Shift to informal sector; 
excessive reliance on 
trade taxes 





control or deregulation 
Note: Direct costs include the direct impacts if the risk materializes.  The costs of coping strategies include the indirect impact of 
coping with the direct impact once the risk has materialized.  The costs of reduction and mitigation strategies include the indirect 
impact of adjusting behavior and incurring costs ex ante to reduce the likelihood of the risk or its potential cost.  
2.1.  Security and the Investment Climate  
Lack of security weakens the investment climate (World Bank, 2004).  This is obvious in the 
case of conflict, which not only reduces the incentives for investment but also weakens 
physical capital (through direct damage, or by diverting funds from operation and 
   5maintenance), financial capital (capital flight), human capital (again through direct impacts—
morbidity, health status—or by indirect impacts such as reduced supply of education and 
health services, outward migration of refugees), and social capital (disruption of 
communities, involvement of men in conflict, worsening mistrust between fighting factions).  
Conflict also disrupts trade and markets, leads to theft of business property by armed 
groups, and imposes “protection costs” on surviving firms.  Most of these costs tend to 
continue for an extended period after the end of the conflict (infrastructure takes time to be 
rebuilt; improving education and health outcomes, as well as social capital, is a slow process; 
capital flight tends to continue or even increase after conflict). 
Criminal activities can weaken the investment climate.  They are often directed against 
businesses and hence directly inflict losses on them, but more damaging is the harm crime 
and perceptions of it do to business investments.  Foreign investors may be discouraged, 
domestic investors may not start activities, and financial capital may flee from high-crime 
areas and countries.  In addition, insecurity can generate macroeconomic instability, also 
weakening the investment climate and further fueling risks of conflict (World Bank, 2003a).  
The indirect costs, related to mitigation strategies, also are large.  Criminality or risk of 
conflict increases uncertainty, to which entrepreneurs respond with more risk-adverse 
strategies.
4  They also can drive business activity into the informal sector, and keep most 
businesses small (so as to avoid visibility vis-à-vis criminals or corrupt officials).  As a 
mitigation strategy, firms may have to pay for private modes of providing security.  For 
instance, the World Bank-sponsored Investment Climate Surveys quantify the resources paid 
by firms for security purposes (Figure 1).  Obviously, this is a fraction of the true cost of lack 
of security given the other indirect impacts listed above.  As is discussed below, insecurity 
also weakens public institutions, opening up vulnerabilities to corruption and further 
weakening the investment climate.  














Source: World Bank, Investment Climate Survey Database. 
These effects on the investment climate have adverse consequences for investment, 
technology, productivity growth, and more generally the competitiveness of the economy, 
                                                 
4 Risk taking can be productive, yielding additional net economic benefits, and therefore can be seen as a production 
factor like physical or human capital. 
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develop and reduce poverty.  But in addition, this in turn has a detrimental impact on the 
capacity of the government to provide security—because the government cannot tax the 
informal sector or because the willingness to pay taxes has been eroded by corruption—and 
hence on security itself.
5  Finally, these various costs, including lower economic growth, tend 
to fall disproportionately on the poor (Box 1). 
Box 1: Cost of Conflict and Insecurity for the Poor, Women, and Children 
The adverse effects of conflict and insecurity, and often of crime as well, tend to be disproportionately felt by the poor, 
minorities, and other vulnerable groups.  This is partly because as in the case of many other public goods, the better-off can 
use their own resources to insulate themselves at least to some extent from insecurity (e.g. risk reduction / mitigation 
strategies such as private security, physical protection through fences etc., mobility), whereas minorities and vulnerable 
groups are at higher risk of being targeted in situations of conflict or breakdown of law and order when the state is no 
longer able to protect its citizens.  To be sure, where insecurity is generalized and long-lasting, the effects reach all levels of 
society, and many assets of the rich may get lost or devalued.  Nevertheless, the poor are invariably more vulnerable to 
conflict and insecurity as they have fewer assets and weaker coping mechanisms to start with.  Even if they lose many of 
their assets, better-off people have a greater chance to escape conflict and tend to be in a better position in terms of 
livelihoods where they flee to. 
Conflict and insecurity can have especially damaging effects from a gender perspective, notably in the form of escalated 
violence against women.  Rape and sexual assault against women of opposing groups in community-based conflicts are 
frequently used as an ultimate means of dishonoring entire communities and reducing people’s capacities to resist military 
advances, causing serious social and psychological disruptions.  Any children resulting from such encounters will often be 
rejected by society and lead a pariah’s existence.  In addition to violence directly against women, the environment of 
insecurity associated with conflict or a post-conflict situation can have a disproportionate adverse effect on women, as 
women’s greater vulnerability in conflict may lead to imposition of stricter social norms resulting in limited or no access to 
education and basic health care due to their reduced mobility.  Prolonged periods of conflict, high levels of social violence, 
and lack of security can also be reflected in increased levels of domestic violence, in which women and children are the 
primary victims.   
Conflict and insecurity have profoundly damaging effects on children.  The loss of one or both parents, homelessness, the 
need to shoulder economic responsibilities in childhood, exposure to violence and abuse, disruption of elementary 
education, and lack of access to health services and immunization are notable examples of conflict-induced consequences 
which have profound and life-long impacts on children. 
 
A way to measure the degree to which the security constraint is binding consists of looking 
at its price (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velazquez, 2005).  From this perspective, high payments 
for security protection constitute additional costs of doing business, constraining growth 
because as a result entrepreneurs cannot fully appropriate the profits from their investments.  
Symptoms of security-related risks constraining growth include large unofficial payments, a 
repressive taxation system, and macroeconomic instability.  Hausmann et al argue that policy 
makers should focus on the binding constraint, as removing other constraints might not only 
fail to generate the desired improvement in the investment climate, but could even have a 
negative impact.  Such analysis of the investment climate could therefore guide the 
prioritization of efforts across security areas (see below); it would also bring out underlying 
governance weaknesses which often are behind the manifestations of insecurity. 
2.2.  Security, Human and Social Capital, and Poverty 
Human and social capital costs, in addition to their impact on the investment climate, have a 
direct negative impact on well-being (see for example World Bank, 2002).  These factors also 
generate dynamic effects—either to cope with the risks or to mitigate them—that further 
increase their costs over time.  Across the board, these various costs tend to impact 
                                                 
5 World Bank (2005a, Chapter 1) outlines a framework in the case of Afghanistan where such vicious or virtuous 
circles are at play. 
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minorities, and women (Box 1), exacerbating poverty.   
Immediate impacts include human costs such as deaths, wounds, displacement, and flight, as 
well as loss of private property and psychological damage.  Moreover warfare, especially 
internal conflicts like civil wars and insurgencies, tends to generate high casualties and other 
costs among the civilian population.  At the individual level, insecurity increases uncertainty 
and vulnerability, making it more difficult for individuals to plan and invest for the future 
and to smooth consumption.  It also limits the availability of informal risk management 
mechanisms, when for instance access to family or kin is disrupted by conflict.  By limiting 
movements of people, crime may also impede access to employment and educational 
opportunities (particularly in the case of females).
6  Finally, ongoing conflict or widespread 
crime weakens the constraints on criminal and opportunistic behavior. 
These costs are compounded by a set of dynamic effects stemming from coping with risks 
once they have materialized.  Disruption of public services like education and health due to 
conflict or insecurity results in lower levels of human capital (due to disruption of education) 
and higher rates of mortality and morbidity (aggravated by the direct adverse impact of 
conflict-related phenomena like displacement on health).  Human capital can be weakened 
by the direct effects of crime on victims, and by the associated atmosphere of fear that may 
encourage many to leave (particularly better-off and skilled people).  A need to smooth 
consumption in the midst of conflict or insecurity can lead to use of costly informal coping 
mechanisms—such as selling assets (e.g. livestock), reducing risk-taking behavior (e.g. by 
shifting production to subsistence crops to avoid uncertainty related to market access), 
shortening time horizons, or turning to illegal activities (e.g. growing illicit crops or engaging 
in smuggling). 
Another set of dynamic effects results from mitigation strategies that may be implemented 
before risks materialize.  Emigration and risk-adverse behaviors on the part of those staying 
in the country lead to less investment in health, education, and innovation, all weakening the 
country’s human and social capital.  The poor and disadvantaged have fewer options to 
mitigate or cope with these risks: hence they tend to be more often and more greatly affected 
by these risks (Box 1).  Informal provision of security by or on behalf of local communities, 
a practice which often arises when governments fail to provide security, carries a risk that 
such mechanisms get captured by political or criminal interests, and that the “summary 
justice” often provided itself can heighten personal insecurity. 
As in the case of investment climate issues, there are tools to gain a better understanding of 
some of these effects.  A number of poverty assessments, and the underlying household 
surveys, seek to measure the vulnerability of people, poor and disadvantaged people in 
particular, to a variety of risks.  Although security-related risks are often less straightforward 
to define and discuss than, say, a climatic risk such as drought, this issue can be analyzed.  
For instance, the National Rural Vulnerability Assessment in Afghanistan asked households 
if they had suffered from violence over the previous twelve months (see also Dercon, 2005). 
                                                 
6 An example is the impediments faced by Tamil fishermen in Eastern Sri Lanka during the civil conflict.  Such 
fishermen were often restricted from entering Colombo to sell their catch.  Due to use of boats by the insurgency, 
fishermen have had restrictions placed on their ability to purchase boat engines above a certain horsepower, and at 
times fishing at night has been restricted.  These are only some examples of how conflict made it more difficult, costly, 
and less rewarding for Tamil fishermen to earn their livelihoods. 
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Finally, lack of security has a very harmful impact on public institutions.  First, it adversely 
affects public finances by directly reducing the capacity to raise revenues if the government 
does not control the country, and raising expenditures on the security sector when insecurity 
is rampant.  Conflict also destroys state assets (direct destruction; erosion due to lack of 
maintenance; destructive conflict between factions contesting State authority).  Second, by 
demonstrating that the government has lost the monopoly over organized violence, a key 
function of the Weberian State, lack of security weakens the legitimacy of the State and 
hence its capacity to deliver (legitimacy tends to make it easier and cheaper for the State to 
collect revenues and deliver services).  Third, crime can become closely linked to corruption 
(itself a form of criminal activity), with very destructive consequences for development and 
public finance management.  Corruption and other forms of crime can erode the revenue 
base of the state and thereby its effective functioning.  As a consequence of these effects, 
trust between people and the state is destroyed or is prevented from being rebuilt.  
Security-related risks also generate suboptimal ex ante risk mitigation and prevention 
strategies by public institutions.  A classic example is the secrecy around security institutions, 
often viewed as a necessary working requirement for these institutions, whereas experience 
in both developed and developing countries indicates otherwise (Roberts, 2007).  Policies 
might also respond in a suboptimal way to a large informal sector, for instance with 
excessive reliance on trade taxes which are easier to collect than consumption taxes (Emran 
and Stiglitz, 2005).  Anti-corruption strategies also can become counterproductive if 
excessive controls and untargeted prosecutions lead to paralysis of the State, or if anti-
corruption is approached by systematically disengaging the State (Khan and Gray, 2006). 
Similarly, coping strategies are costly.  The imperative of revenue collection can lead to 
excessive enforcement that further deters private investors.  Widespread corruption 
encourages private deals with corrupt officials.  Government policies become oriented 
excessively toward the short-term. 
Unfortunately, the adverse implications of insecurity for development and for public 
institutions continue, and in some respects may increase, after the end of outright conflict.  
So-called “legacy” costs of conflict, based on cross-country analysis (see World Bank, 2003a, 
pp. 19-31), include in particular (i) higher residual military expenditure;
7 (ii) government 
policies, which on average are negatively affected after conflict; (iii) deterioration of political 
institutions which takes time to reverse; and (iv) destruction of the revenue apparatus and 
loss of revenue culture, which tends to persist after conflict.  These legacy costs are often 
associated with constituencies created during the conflict.  For instance, higher military 
expenditure is usually controlled by interest groups of government officials and military 
commanders that have little incentive to reduce the size of the army.  Corruption can also 
result in the State degenerating into a “mafia state” where the interests of corrupt officials 
are closely aligned with those of a corrupt private sector.  Weakened (possibly autocratic) 
political institutions have very limited incentives to reform themselves toward a more 
participatory and citizen-based approach.  For instance, Kaufman (2005) notes that the 
proportion of firms reporting high costs of organized crime in countries with low 
institutional capacity of the parliament or police is two to four times higher than is reported 
in countries with high capacity.   
                                                 
7 Gupta et al (2002) report that, based on 22 conflict episodes, armed conflict is associated with lower tax revenues, 
higher government spending on defense, and less macroeconomic stability. 
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public finance (revenue collection and allocation of resources to the security sector); political 
institutions (and accountability to the public at large); and corruption (which requires also 
looking at the quality of public administration).  Elements of such a diagnostic are presented 
in Sections 3 to 5.  
Finally, it must be recognized that in addition to the causal link from insecurity to weak and 
problematic public institutions as described above, the reverse causation also occurs: 
worsening and weakening public institutions can promote, or at least leave greater scope for, 
greater insecurity.  Moreover, stronger but repressive and predatory states generate insecurity 
for their populations and can be the main source of human insecurity in some countries.  
While such states may be able to prevent outright conflict in the short run through 
repression, experience in some countries suggests that this may build up tensions over time, 
sometimes resulting in much greater conflict and insecurity when the repressive regime in 
the end fails.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these issues in detail, the 
complex and two-way causation between security and public institutions must be kept in 
mind.  
2.4.  Summing Up 
There are two lessons from this review of the linkages between security and development. 
The first lesson is that security very much matters.  Lack of security directly weakens the 
investment climate, erodes human and social capital, and weakens public institutions.   
Governments must therefore devise strategies to improve security.  However, there is also a 
second lesson: security cannot be seen in isolation, for two reasons. 
First, abolishing security-related risks is impossible (or too expensive for available resources).  
Hence a security strategy must be cognizant of the private responses to security risks.  Lack 
of security leads individuals, communities, and firms to take actions to reduce the likelihood 
or potential impact of risks (before they actually occur) and to cope with risks once they 
materialize.  There is a role for government when these actions can themselves have a 
negative development impact (typically because they use suboptimal informal devices). 
Second, there are mutually reinforcing effects between security on the one hand and the 
investment climate, human and social capital, and public institutions on the other.  Hence 
there can be virtuous or vicious circles between security and these three development 
objectives (Figure 2).  In essence, security risks can be reduced and mitigated through a 
better investment climate—economic activity generates revenues for the government, which 
creates fiscal space to provide security services, and reduces the profitability of illegal 
activities relative to legal activities; stronger human and social capital—trust in the polity 
facilitates conflict resolution; and effective institutions—they provide the required 
accountability framework for proper decision-making and policy implementation in the 
security sector, and they also provide more effective conflict resolution mechanisms.  As 
noted in World Bank (2003a), the probability of civil war tends to decrease with faster 
economic growth and stronger institutions, which in turn require a base of good governance. 
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outcomes 
 
Source: authors’ summary.   
3. Public Finance in the Security Sector 
In this section we apply a public finance framework to the security sector, which considers 
three key levels of fiscal outcomes: aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency of fiscal 
resources, and operational or technical efficiency (World Bank, 1998).  Using this 
framework, we show that, by and large, principles of good public finance management can 
and should be applied to the security sector, at all three of these levels.  
3.1.  Aggregate Fiscal Discipline 
The objective of fiscal sustainability is founded on two rationales.  First, to make the budget 
an effective policy instrument, budgets have to be realistic.  Otherwise they become 
irrelevant since they are never implemented.  Second, there is solid evidence that poor fiscal 
policy—notably in the form of large budget deficits for unproductive purposes or financed 
by loose monetary policy—has a negative impact on inflation and growth, and hence on 
poverty.  In fact, since there is also evidence that macroeconomic instability can be a source 
of conflict (World Bank, 2003a), fiscal discipline can be viewed as a necessary condition for a 
country to achieve its security objectives.  Finally, a focus on fiscal discipline is critical since 
an obvious risk mitigation strategy would be to build very large security forces, which—
beyond the potential governance and security (e.g. coups d’etat) related issues—would 
jeopardize fiscal stability and hence macroeconomic stability, thereby defeating the risk 
mitigation strategy.  Applying this principle generates three lessons. 
First and foremost, and applicable to prioritization of spending within the security sector 
(see below) as well as aggregate security sector expenditures, the security budget and the 
budgets of its main components (defense, interior, justice, etc.) should be prepared against 
clear strategies—at the overall, sector, and subsector levels—and corresponding policies.  
The security strategy in turn needs to be an integral part of the broader national 
development strategy.  These principles are applicable to all parts of the public sector, and 
security should be no exception.  This issue is reviewed in more detail in the next section. 
Second, as for the budget as a whole and as with any other sector, security sector policies 
and expenditures must be affordable, both in the short run (annual budget) and in terms of 
   11their implications for spending in future years (e.g. decisions on staffing levels, associated 
non-salary costs, implied pension liabilities, procurement of equipment, and other sustaining 
costs).  This implies that the security sector needs to be fully incorporated in the annual 
budget formulation process, subject to aggregate fiscal constraints and sector ceilings like any 
other sector.  It also means that the security sector must be fully incorporated in medium-
term fiscal projections and planning.  Finally, all government transactions in the security 
sector should be on-budget, including revenues earned directly by security sector entities.   
Third and equally important is the need for transparency and information, without which 
decision makers cannot make informed choices with respect to the budget.  Legitimate issues 
of confidentiality may constrain public dissemination of some information, but this should 
not prevent sufficient relevant information from being made available to decision makers, if 
necessary through devices like closed budget hearings and the like.  Inclusion of the security 
sector in the PFM system is essential to achieve the principles of honesty and predictability, 
i.e. basing the budget on unbiased projections of revenue and expenditure, and stability in 
policies and funding.  
3.2.  Allocative Efficiency 
Allocating fiscal resources efficiently across and within sectors is arguably the most difficult 
of the three levels of effective public finance.  Section 2 has made the case that security 
counts.  Although spending on defense and other security components can enhance growth 
prospects, given potential inefficiencies in the sector and competing needs from many other 
sectors, there is a need for (i) a few benchmarks to guide allocations, and (ii) a solid process 
for making allocation decisions.  We focus here on the first element, coming back to the 
second in Section 5. 
A first guidepost is to take into account the allocation of fiscal resources in other 
countries.  This is inevitably a simplistic approach given that different countries face very 
different security-related risks (including due to the differential influence of geography), 
while costs also are country-specific (given significant economies of scale in the security 
sector and frequent use of alliances to share costs).  In addition, cross-country comparisons 
are all the more difficult in the security sector because the quality of available data is poor.
8  
Finally, this approach also takes a narrow focus on a small number of security institutions, 
while Section 2 suggested that the perspective needs to be broadened.  Nevertheless, and 
keeping these caveats in mind, based on available data defense spending ranges in most 
countries between 1-5% of GDP (Treverton, 2005; Table 3).   
                                                 
8 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has been conducting research on this area for some 
time and has documented a number of issues related to data on military expenditures.  Some military expenditures can 
be off-budget, buried in ministries other than the Ministry of Defense, etc. 






Afghanistan a/ 56.5                  13.2          6.4                      
Belarus 18.4                  1.2            1.2                      
Bolivia 18.1                  1.7            1.8                      
Bulgaria 20.6                  2.3            1.9                      
India 16.7                  2.6            n/a
Jordan 31.7                  6.0            2.9                      
Kazakhstan 13.7                  0.6            1.3                      
Kyrgyz Republic 18.0                  1.7            1.1                      
Moldova 21.2                  0.4            1.3                      
Pakistan 22.8                  4.5            0.3                      
Philippines 19.6                  1.0            1.4                      
Romania 16.4                  1.3            1.8                      
Senegal 13.1                  1.6            n/a
Sri Lanka 25.6                4.5          1.1                    
a/ includes "External Budget", cf. World Bank (2005).  
Source: IMF (GFS), World Bank (2005). 
A second guidepost is to assess the rationale for using public resources in the sector.  A 
long tradition of welfare economics has discussed the role of the public sector in 
implementing various policies.  The general lesson is that public expenditures are justified as 
a correction for market failures (such as externalities, public goods, imperfect information) 
or for redistribution.  Nevertheless, as noted by Devarajan et al (1996), “neither economic 
theory nor empirical evidence provides clear-cut answers to how the composition of 
expenditure affects economic growth.” On this basis, Paternostro, Rajaram, and Tiongson 
(2005) provide a framework to assess the issue of allocative efficiency, in three steps. 
The first question is to assess whether public intervention—as opposed to private 
intervention—is necessary.  The discussion above has shown that dealing with security-
related risks is often a public good.  Defense against external security threats is essentially a 
pure public good at the national level.  Internal public security, supported by the police and 
justice system, comes close to being a pure local public good for the locality concerned 
(although access may well be inequitable).  Justice is also a public good in that its existence 
benefits everyone.  However, any particular justice transaction benefits (or harms) 
individuals, and moreover, in many countries people in need of recourse may have a 
considerable degree of choice as to whether to go through the formal justice system or 
instead rely on traditional informal mechanisms for this purpose.  Landmine clearance has 
elements of both a public and a private service; the private benefits are high if the land de-
mined is under private ownership, whereas the public benefits are high if it is publicly 
owned/used land (e.g. roads or irrigation canals).  Border management and intelligence are 
also essentially national public goods.
9 
Nevertheless, all these functions might not necessarily be provided by the public sector.  For 
instance, effective rule of law is a public good as it allows enforcement of contracts.   
However, Dixit (2004) provides a number of examples where public provision might not be 
needed to ensure contract enforcement, for instance if contract enforcement is based on 
relations instead of rule of law or where there are private incentives for the enforcement of 
                                                 
9 There are also a number of functions that have important linkages with security risks, such as diplomacy, customs, 
safety nets, etc.  We do not explicitly review these functions in this paper. 
   13contracts (this strengthens the point made above about analyzing the investment climate to 
assess, in this case, what is the constraint on economic growth and contract enforcement). 
Similarly, arguments about public goods or difficulties in drafting contracts usually do not 
justify ownership of state-owned enterprises and production of merchandise by the defense 
sector.  This often happens, however; for example, the military in Indonesia raises money 
outside the government budget through a variety of businesses; these businesses provide 
paid services; and many of them are not even controlled by the military’s central command 
(Misol, 2006).  Beyond the fact that it is not the best use of public resources, this practice 
raises a number of efficiency problems (badly managed firms) and governance issues (for 
example poor procurement practices in the sector; refusal of these defense-related firms to 
pay tax).  
Second, public intervention does not necessarily mean public expenditure.  Other forms of 
public interventions include regulations and tax policy.
10  Advanced countries, in particular, 
very often use regulations to reduce security-related risks.  An interesting policy question in 
this regard is the mix of enforcement and fines.  Indeed, Polinsky and Shavell (2005) suggest 
that in general enforcement could be reduced and fines raised, leading to a similar but less 
expensive level of deterrence.  In Section 4, we return to the question of public provision of 
services (as opposed to public financing of private provision)  
Third, security-related outcomes depend on various sector interventions, not only those in 
the security sector.  Such synergies between the various sectors need to be taken into 
account.  Not only do these sectors compete for a limited pool of resources, but in addition 
the key outcomes (such as growth and security) are determined by a combination of 
expenditures in the various sectors (plus the role of the private sector).  The importance of 
this point was brought out very clearly in our discussion of the risk management framework 
in Section 2 (with both security sector-related issues influencing allocations in other sectors 
and the other way around).  The three levels of risk reduction, mitigation, and coping indeed 
suggest broadening beyond the traditional approach to security, which has often been 
focused on (i) reducing risks, largely through deterrence, by increasing force size, patrolling, 
etc.  This broadening would involve approaches to (ii) mitigating risks (investing in a 
diversified portfolio of income and assets, which requires a sound growth and political 
normalization strategy; possibly investment in insurance schemes, either by the formal 
financial system or informal community-based systems), and (iii) coping with risks (capacity 
to investigate and prosecute crimes; support to victims).  These linkages are important within 
the security sector as well, for instance in terms of complementarities between prosecution, 
justice, and the prison system, as is widely recognized in the literature on security sector 
reform.  Security can also be linked with other social risk management mechanisms, such as 
ensuring macroeconomic stability, developing a sound financial sector, etc. (see also Ghani 
and Lockhart, 2006).  
3.3.  Operational Efficiency 
The third level of this framework consists of ensuring that the public resources appropriated, 
both for the security sector and for other sectors, are used efficiently and effectively.  As in 
the case of allocative efficiency, a critical requirement is to utilize a range of instruments and 
                                                 
10 We do not discuss the issue of tax policy in this paper given that most developing countries have limited capacity to 
administer these policies and are struggling to increase revenues.  It is not inconceivable however that policymakers for 
instance could decide to favor through the tax code firms that take certain precautions to reduce security-related risks. 
   14processes in the budget execution sphere (see Section 5).  In this section, we focus on 
analytical tools to assess the operational efficiency of security sector spending. 
Analysis in other sectors typically proceeds with the measurement of unit costs, outcome (or 
output or effectiveness) indicators, and rates of return (cost / benefit analysis could be used 
to guide allocations especially within sectors—see World Bank, 2005, Volume 1, Chapter 
5—although such analysis has limitations).  In theory, the security sector should be subjected 
to the same discipline.  Examples include: 
•  For defense, preparedness indicators (although more akin to output indicators rather 
than to outcomes) are a highly appropriate performance indicator in peacetime. 
•  For the police, and for the internal security system more generally, the ultimate 
outcome of local security and rule of law is difficult to measure, especially in 
Afghanistan where crime statistics are virtually non-existent.  Information from 
surveys on the numbers and types of crime encountered by households could be 
useful, however.  The availability and readiness of police staff, including female 
police officers and separate detention facilities for women, can be useful indicators, 
in the case of women officers mitigating the risks women face during detention. 
•  The performance of the justice system can be measured by various indicators like 
numbers of cases handled, timeliness of processing court cases, and households’ 
perceptions of the justice system and their indications of willingness (or otherwise) 
to use formal justice channels when seeking redress. 
•  In the case of mine action, outcomes of mine clearance activities (land and areas free 
of landmines—with clear linkage to ultimate development benefits) can be specified 
and measured reasonably well, and compared with the costs of mine clearance. 
•  For counter-narcotics, the appropriate outcome indicator at the national level is 
progressive reduction over time and eventual elimination of the opium economy.  
However, measuring the performance of counter-narcotics activities is difficult, and 
linking such performance to progress toward achieving the strategic objective of 
reducing opium production and trade is even more difficult.  Given the variety of 
activities encompassed under the counter-narcotics rubric, performance indicators 
for the different components need to be differentiated appropriately.  For example, 
indicators of rural development and agricultural progress can measure the ability of 
the rural economy to reduce dependence on illicit narcotics production over the 
longer term. 
•  More generally, in all parts of the security sector some basic indicators of inputs can 
be useful in measuring performance, for example number and ratio of staff on the 
job (confirmed by spot-inspections), percentage of staff in security services properly 
equipped, proportion of staff who have received training, percentage of budget 
resources spent, etc.  Expenditure tracking surveys can be a useful tool in this regard. 
•  Unit costs, although not an outcome indicator, can be useful performance indicators 
of the efficiency with which inputs for service delivery are being provided. 
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that this approach has limitations in the security sector, 
for two main reasons.  First, in many cases the objective is to save human lives.  Although 
not insurmountable—the concept of Disability Adjusted Life Year, which provides a 
common measure for comparing the burden of disease taking into account both death and 
disability arising from illness, is used in the health sector—measuring the cost of a life is 
   15difficult.  Second, measuring benefits in the security sector involves low-risk (yet high-cost, 
even catastrophic) events and numerous prevention activities, also difficult to quantify.  It is 
therefore very important to place security sector institutions in an adequate accountability 
framework and to follow clear and transparent processes, as discussed in the next two 
sections. 
4. Security as a Public Service 
As noted earlier, security is an essential service that needs to be delivered.  Thus taking a 
service delivery approach makes good sense, and provides some guidance for improving 
public finance management in the security sector, particularly with respect to institutions, 
incentives, and accountability.  The distinctive features of security as a public service need to 
be taken into account, however. 
4.1.  Conceptual Framework 
A simple model illustrates the institutions, accountability relationships, and financial flows 
associated with service delivery and their implications (World Bank, 2003b).
11  There are 
three main actors: the people (as citizens and consumers/clients of services), the state (as 
political body and policymaker), and the service providers (which could be public or private).  
The interactions by which these three actors influence and are accountable to each other 
form an “accountability triangle” (see Figure 3a), and there are correspondingly financial 
flows among them (Figure 3b). The people can affect service delivery by influencing policy 
makers (e.g. by voting or through the advocacy role of civil society), who in turn exert 
influence on the service providers (this is the so-called “long route” of accountability).   
Citizens can also directly influence service providers (the “short route” of accountability) by 
selecting the provider (when there is competition), using their voice (e.g. complaints), or 
making financial contributions (when there is cost recovery).  Another important set of 
actors in developing countries is the donor community, which exerts influence through its 
dialogue with policymakers, its financing, and its direct contracts with service providers. 
Figure 3: Service Delivery Framework 























Source: Adapted from World Bank (2003b). 
One of the main messages emerging from this conceptual framework is that it is often 
possible to improve service delivery by strengthening the short route of accountability, i.e. 
                                                 
11 In this discussion, “accountability” basically means “answerability”—the obligations to answer questions on what 
has been and will be done and why.  Sanctions can be legal, financial, political, or just reputational. 
   16through relationships and accountability mechanisms directly between the service providers 
and the beneficiaries of the service (and their communities).  Another key message is the 
need for donors to reinforce the accountability of service providers rather than inadvertently 
undermining accountability by making direct payments to them (in the form of cash, salary 
top-ups, in-kind contributions, etc.).  This framework can also shed light on financing issues 
related to service delivery, specifically that there is scope for cost recovery (a financial flow 
from beneficiary to service provider) to be an instrument of accountability as well as for 
covering the cost of services. 
4.2.  Distinctive Features of Security 
In applying this conceptual framework to the security sector, it needs to be kept in mind that 
security as a public service has some distinctive characteristics that affect the way it is 
delivered and the options for accountability and financing arrangements.   
First, as discussed earlier, a state of security of the public from violence of all kinds comes 
close to being a pure public good, meaning that everyone in the locality (in the case of 
internal security) or in the country (in the case of external security, i.e. defense) benefits from 
a situation with a general level of security.  This implies that the set of actual or potential 
beneficiaries is no different from the population of the locality or the country, and that cost 
recovery from beneficiaries is not possible.  However, access to public security services 
(ranging from the police to courts) may be far from equitable for all, and moreover 
individuals may have very different capacities to mitigate and cope with security-related risks 
(for instance, vulnerability and coping strategies depend on income and assets: richer 
households are able to augment their own personal security through expending resources on 
private security guards, better physical protection of their property, locks and alarm systems, 
etc.; see Box 1). 
Second, security in a fundamental sense involves the threat and use of force against internal 
or external threats to security.  This capacity to use force can be misused, as seen in many 
countries affected by civil conflict as well as in other countries characterized by repressive or 
predatory states.  Even potential—as opposed to actual—misuse of force can generate risk 
mitigating and risk coping measures that negatively affect people’s lives and businesses’ 
prospects.  Security forces easily can become a source of insecurity rather than security for 
the populace.  Moreover, monitoring the performance of security service providers can be 
difficult, as security forces (such as police) are armed and potentially can threaten civilian 
monitors (see World Bank, 2003b, Box 3.3, p. 54, for a discussion on creating conditions for 
accountability in the police). 
Third, and related to the other two characteristics, effective provision of public security 
involves a monopoly in the provision of the service, i.e. the legitimate exercise of force, 
which is a fundamental attribute of a functioning state (see World Bank, 2005a, Box 4.1, p. 
45).  Competition in the realm of security results in insecurity rather than improved 
security.
12   
Fourth, the function of reducing or mitigating security-related risks is in essence difficult to 
monitor.  Some exactions of armed forces for instance are difficult to monitor, because of 
the threat of use of force or because they happen in remote areas (e.g. border areas).   
                                                 
12 However, competitive tendering can and should be used in contracting for certain security-related 
services like landmine clearance (see World Bank, 2005b, Volume V, Box 6.1, p. 63). 
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system—the arbitration system of last resort—can be difficult as there may be little recourse 
to complain.  In addition, measurement of outcomes and performance in terms of 
security is not easy, as the presence of security is essentially the absence of insecurity and 
associated adverse outcomes.  In particular, it would be easy to overlook the implications of 
security risks in terms of risk-mitigating and risk-coping responses.  This issue was discussed 
in section 3.3 on operational efficiency. 
Finally,  contracting security-related tasks is difficult, notably because outcomes are 
difficult to monitor, but also because of the issue of use of force.  For instance, Hart, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) review the evidence for and against privatizing prison 
management: while justice is a public good, one could indeed argue that keeping prisoners is 
a public good that can be contracted out (a key outcome—prisoners do not escape—is easy 
to monitor).  But the authors argue against privatization, in particular for two reasons: first 
because of the difficulty of drafting a contract that would ensure good quality (including 
safety) at a reasonable cost and, second, because to reduce costs, a private prison might 
recruit under-trained guards who might overuse force to control prisoners.   
4.3.  Implications of a Service Delivery Approach for the Security Sector  
As discussed above, the first implication is that security-related risks most often need to be 
addressed by public intervention.  In most cases (but not all—see the earlier discussion on 
Dixit, 2004), for reasons discussed above (performance oversight, contracting) this should 
translate into public provision of these services (as opposed to privatization or contracting 
out).  But there are many challenges facing efforts to achieve effective service delivery in the 
security sector.  
The first extremely important implication is that effective oversight by the civil authorities 
is essential.  Particularly in the case of the army and other national security forces, the long 
route of accountability is the only viable one, and this requires that service providers 
(security forces) are accountable to the state, which is in turn accountable to the population 
for ensuring the provision of security.  Legitimate oversight by the civil authorities with 
respect to both national security forces and local police is also important because of the risk 
that otherwise power would be abused. 
Second, in the case of local security forces providing a localized public good, there is scope 
to enhance the accountability of the service providers directly to the local population they 
are serving—while recognizing the risk of elite capture at the local level.  Police is a good 
example.  The importance of good police-community relations, which strengthens the short 
route of accountability, has been widely recognized.  More generally, we have seen that a 
number of the risk mitigation and risk coping strategies are decided and implemented at the 
community level.  In this context, effective complaints channels and other short-route 
accountability mechanisms are very important, and women and other vulnerable groups in 
particular need to have access to them.
13  
Third, as far as local rule of law and security services are concerned (police, and much of the 
judiciary), it makes sense to consider some form of de-concentration of government 
                                                 
13 With respect to cost recovery as an additional vehicle to promote accountability, it is doubtful whether 
there would be any circumstances where user fees should be introduced in this area.  A possible exception 
could be for the justice system, for the part that relates to contract enforcement between private parties. 
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functional at the local level and not “captured” by regional or local powerbrokers.   
Fourth, when the short route of accountability cannot be strengthened and the long route of 
accountability proves counterproductive, an option is independence of some security-
related functions.  A degree of independence is often advisable for the justice system, to 
insulate it from daily politics.  Maskin and Tirole (2004) demonstrate the desirability of 
“judges” as opposed to “politicians” (in their terminology), contrasting “unaccountable” 
judges with politicians that could overreact to what they perceive as people’s demands and  
could be insufficiently attentive to minorities. 
Fifth, despite major difficulties, as emphasized earlier it is critically important to develop 
monitoring frameworks and performance indicators so that oversight bodies, and 
ultimately the people, can assess performance with regard to security. 
Finally, in the case of aid-dependent countries, the importance of the international 
community  reinforcing and not inadvertently distorting or undermining accountability 
relationships is at least as great in the security sector as in other sectors (Box 2).   This 
implies that international partners should as much as possible work through government 
budget channels and not build up parallel structures, avoid undermining service providers’ 
accountability relationship with the state (which can happen for example if they provide 
resources, e.g. in kind or through salary top-ups, directly to the providers), resist “flagging” 
projects they support to the detriment of the government’s visibility, and encourage cost 
containment for example by supporting competitive procurement. 
Box 2: Aid Effectiveness in the Security Sector 
As in the case of other themes discussed in this paper, the recommendations for the international community 
with respect to aid effectiveness more generally (including harmonization, country ownership, use of country 
systems, etc.) should apply in the security sector.  There are however obvious geo-strategic and sovereignty 
issues to take into account. 
In the public finance management area, there is a need to integrate donor funding into the budget so as to 
maximize the benefits from (i) assessing trade-offs across budget lines; (ii) analysis and evaluation of 
expenditures; and (iii) ensuring accountability and transparency in use of budget resources.   
Perhaps the most pressing question is that of fiscal sustainability.  As the example of Afghanistan shows, the 
role of the international community in helping ensure that the security sector is affordable is critical—given its 
role in making decisions on pay levels and troop levels, its significant financial contribution to the sector; etc. 
There are also a number of institutional issues to consider in making aid to the security sector more effective, 
including: (i) fragmentation across security sector institutions (possibly compounded by fragmentation of 
external assistance if different donors are supporting different institutions); (ii) sequencing of interventions in 
the security sector (coordinating the strengthening of justice and police for instance given the 
complementarities of their outputs in relation to the outcome of better security); and (iii) wage practices 
(including pay levels suggested for troops; top-ups paid to troops; salary levels of recruits in private security 
firms operating for the international community; etc.).  
Finally, while this paper has mainly focused on the perspective of developing countries, the international 
community can also consider trade-offs in its assistance toward security objectives.  The cost-effectiveness of 
external military intervention can be assessed against the cost effectiveness of supporting the strengthening of 
the local army.  Similarly, the cost effectiveness of interventions in the security sector can be assessed against 
that of other interventions that can be expected to reduce the risks or costs of conflict.  For example, increased 
development assistance, if it results in development progress in the recipient country, could by reducing the risk 
of conflict there result in lower costs for peacekeeping and future aid.  It could also lead to savings on counter-
terrorism costs in the donor country (see Treverton and Klitgaard, 2005). 
   195. Security as a Governance Issue 
In this section, we review the security sector from a governance point of view.  This is a very 
important approach since, just as good governance is important in the security sector (as 
discussed in this section), security itself is important for good overall governance (as 
discussed earlier).  We define good governance to include many dimensions (Figure 4).  As 
in the case of other aspects reviewed in this paper, good governance principles can and 
should be applied to the security sector, with appropriate modifications to take into account 
confidentiality considerations where necessary (but not in a blanket manner or in a way that 
undermines the fundamental principle of accountability to elected civil authorities).   We first 
focus on public financial management and then review other aspects. 
Figure 4: Dimensions of Good Governance 
 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
5.1.  Public Financial Management Processes 
Public Financial Management (PFM) processes comprise a core dimension of governance.  
The role of these processes is to enable strong progress toward the broad budgetary 
outcomes discussed in Section 3.  To analyze the performance of the PFM system, the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) multi-agency partnership program 
has identified six critical dimensions of a well-functioning PFM system (PEFA, 2005).  Four 
of these comprise important parts of the budget cycle (policy-based budgeting; predictability 
and control in budget execution; accounting, recording, and reporting; and external scrutiny 
and audit—see Figure 5).  Another relates to key cross-cutting features of the budget 
process, i.e. comprehensiveness and transparency, and the last covers out-turns of the PFM 
   20system, namely the credibility of the budget.  Figure 5 also signals that, given the importance 
of external financial support in many developing countries, donor practices have a significant 
impact on the performance of the PFM system (Box 2). 
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Source: PEFA (2005). 
We now turn to these six dimensions of the PFM framework.  The key message, again, is 
that good PFM practices should by and large be applied to the security sector as well. 
The first dimension, PFM out-turns, is very much related to the issues of fiscal 
sustainability discussed above.  Another important aspect is the gap between budgets 
approved by the executive and legislature on the one hand and actual expenditures on the 
other.  Systematic deviations, often with security institutions spending much more (at least as 
a share of the total budget if not in absolute terms) than other sectors, are a sign of poor or 
deceptive budgeting.  Such deviations reduce the credibility of the budget, hence weakening 
its role as a policy tool.  On the contrary, even where security requirements change 
unexpectedly, the resource implications should be managed through the budget process. 
The second dimension, comprehensiveness and transparency, is of particular relevance to 
the security sector.  Comprehensiveness means that the security sector is fully incorporated 
in the budget and budget process.  Comprehensiveness is sometimes challenged by real or 
alleged confidentiality issues (see next paragraph).  Another challenge is the role of the 
international community, which often supports the sector financially but without using 
normal budget systems (see Box 2).  Comprehensiveness also means that all sectors 
(including security) must compete on a level playing field for funding during budget planning 
and formulation.  This does not imply a mechanical or “equity” based allocation of 
resources, but rather that different sectors contest for resources during the budget 
formulation process on an equal footing based on their role in the national strategy and (for 
sub-sectors) within the corresponding sector strategy.
14 
Transparency in the security sector is contentious given the nature of the sector, which in 
some specific cases requires confidentiality leading to a culture of secrecy.  Nevertheless, 
traditional arguments in favor of transparency apply to the security sector as well: (i) sharing 
                                                 
14 This dimension also encompasses good management of fiscal risks, which includes sound oversight of 
state-owned enterprises.  As noted above, in theory security sector institutions should not oversee public 
enterprises, but in practice this is frequently the case.  The problems associated with such a situation should 
not be compounded by lack of transparency and monitoring of the concerned SOEs. 
   21information allows for better political participation and better policy decisions; (ii) it fosters 
coordination with other sectors (security has to be seen in a broad context); (iii) monitoring 
is important to ensure accountability and fight bureaucratic inertia; (iv) transparency 
encourages self-restraint (potentially desirable to avoid risk-mitigating reactions); and (v) 
overall, transparency supports better implementation (see Roberts, 2007).  This is not to 
deny that there are areas where secrecy is desirable, for instance to protect judicial or 
intelligence sources or to create a strategic advantage of surprise vis-à-vis an enemy.  But 
there is also the risk that secrecy directives would be excessive and carry consequences 
(according to Roberts, 2007, the ordinance on state secrets in Vietnam is so broad that some 
economic data generally available in other countries are classified).  Hence security sector-
specific exceptions to transparency should be limited and clearly understood.  In particular, 
there is little or no justification for withholding general information on agency budgets 
(including budgets of intelligence agencies). 
The third dimension, policy-based budgeting, covers processes by which resources are 
allocated according to strategic priorities both within the security sector and across all 
sectors (including security).  Sector strategies are critical in this regard, as are the broad 
priorities indicated in the overall national strategy for development.  Figure 6 presents a 
generic process for defense policy and organizational reviews, which is broadly applicable to 
other parts of a country’s security sector as well.  While the full complexity shown need not 
be followed in every case, the main elements need to be present. 
Figure 6: Process of Conducting Defense Reviews/Developing Defense Policy Frameworks 
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Source: Adapted from Ball, Bouta, and Goor (2003, p. 53). 
These policy development and organizational review processes need to be guided from the 
beginning by an indicative fiscal framework to promote sustainability (see Section 3 on fiscal 
affordability).  Review processes should be as transparent and inclusive as possible.  Insofar 
as they are based on broad consultations among the relevant stakeholders, and if the final 
product is made public, for example through the publication of a policy paper, their 
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linkage with setting the defense policy framework (in the case of defense, the strategy needs 
to be based on a transparent “threat assessment” fully owned by the government), assessing 
different fiscal options, and ensuring oversight by relevant executive and legislative bodies. 
Finally, prioritization must take into account issues of resource allocation over time.  A 
classic misallocation of funds found in many countries is building physical assets like 
infrastructure, or service delivery networks like education and health systems, without 
planning for or even taking into account the associated recurrent expenditure requirements.  
The same can occur in the security sector, where lethal and non-lethal equipment may be 
procured, facilities constructed, or security forces expanded, without consideration of their 
full life-cycle costs.  While in annual budgets this will be manifested as an imbalance between 
capital and recurrent expenditures, in particular shortfalls in non-wage recurrent spending, 
from a medium-term perspective the problem is one of prioritizing between present and 
future expenditures in line with sustainable force sizes and administrative and service 
delivery structures.  Thus a medium-term fiscal perspective is an essential tool for 
prioritization as well as for assessing overall fiscal affordability (see above). 
The fourth dimension, predictability and control in budget execution, covers various 
areas ranging from internal control (payroll and non-salary) to procurement.
15  The control 
framework, and also the accounting categories and reporting process (see next dimension), 
are very important for effective and efficient utilization of budgetary resources.  Hence good 
practice calls for standardizing these important components of the PFM system in all 
sectors, including the security sector. 
One area where different procedures are followed in many countries in the security sector, 
especially in the case of defense, is procurement.  The overriding objective of a national 
public procurement system is to deliver efficiency and value for money in the use of public 
funds, while adhering to fundamental principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment, and 
transparency.  Procurement is therefore at the core of the PFM system and contributes 
greatly to several of its objectives, including efficiency, transparency, and accountability. 
Defense, security, and budgeting specialists generally take the position that security sector 
procurement and acquisition practices should adhere to the same principles that guide 
procurement in non-security parts of the public sector: fairness, impartiality, transparency, 
cost-effectiveness/efficiency, and openness to competition.  In addition, it is essential that 
there be systematic evaluation of all major procurement transactions for all forms of public 
sector procurement. 
However, defense budgeting specialists have also noted that—with the exception of 
procurement of works and most commodities (such as construction, clothing, food, fuel, 
office equipment, general vehicles, and consultancy services)—defense acquisition in 
particular (and also to a lesser extent other security acquisitions) does exhibit some 
distinctive characteristics.  These relate to: (i) the relative importance of cost in determining 
which bid is accepted; (ii) confidentiality related to national security considerations; (iii) the 
time frame required for major weapons procurements; (iv) complexity of defense 
                                                 
15 The framework also covers performance and controls in revenue collection.  In theory, this should be irrelevant to the 
security sector as all revenues should be managed by civilian authorities, the Ministry of Finance in particular.  In 
practice, however, it is not unusual for security institutions to seek to directly control certain revenue sources (including 
in some cases customs or tolls).  This is problematic from the point of view of governance and rule of law (risk of 
abuse of power; extortion), and also fragments resources through earmarking (or even diversion of resources). 
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legislation governing arms procurement.   These distinctive characteristics are deviations in 
application rather than of principle.  There certainly should be skepticism about any claims 
that procurement of relatively standard works, services, and commodities for defense or any 
other part of the security sector should be subject to different rules. 
More specifically, considerations of confidentiality need not and should not prevent the key 
principles of good procurement practice from being fully applied throughout the security 
sector.  Not doing so runs the risk of limiting competition, raising costs, and exacerbating 
vulnerability to corruption (which can be a significant risk particularly in the case of larger 
defense procurements).  While as noted, confidentiality is a legitimate consideration for 
certain types of procurement in the security sector (e.g. advanced defense equipment), much 
of the procurement for security forces (food, uniforms, transport vehicles, small arms and 
ammunition, etc.) does not involve overriding confidentiality considerations.  In any case, it 
is important that sound public procurement principles and procedures be applied to the 
security sector, with appropriate provisions to ensure confidentiality where necessary. 
The fifth dimension, accounting, recording, and reporting, covers a number of key 
financial management processes.  These are important because they serve the objectives of 
transparency, accountability, and performance evaluation.  In line with the principles of 
comprehensiveness and consistency of treatment of different sectors, the security sector 
should be covered by the government-wide treasury system—otherwise financial 
information for the security sector will not be available on a comparable basis with other 
sectors throughout the budget cycle.  Related to this, classification systems used for security 
(including defense) need to be fully consistent with those used in the rest of the budget. 
The sixth dimension, external scrutiny and audit, covers external audit and oversight, the 
need for which (with appropriate provisions in line with confidentiality concerns as 
necessary) is just as great in the security sector as in other sectors.  The Auditor General 
should have sufficient access to transactions and performance indicators in the security 
sector, and its audit reports should be adequately discussed in Parliament (which should also 
be allowed to engage in meaningful debate over the budgets of security sector agencies).  If 
needed, and as discussed above, this process (both with the Auditor General and in 
Parliament) could be restricted to smaller groups that have adequate security clearance (e.g. 
through a special Security Committee in Parliament).  Treverton and Klitgaard (2005) 
suggest a number of questions to raise about the quality of external scrutiny:  (i) Are there 
clearly defined executive and legislative responsibilities for external and internal/domestic 
security?  (ii) Are the security forces subject to democratic control?  (iii) Are 
parliamentarians, the media, and civil society free and capable to participate in the security 
debate and are they doing so?  (iv) Are the security forces able to exercise political influence?  
(v) Are the security services open to unnecessary political interference through political 
reach-down into the promotion system?  (vi) Are the security forces more loyal to the regime 
or to the people?  (vii) Are there budgetary checks, balances, and internal and external audit, 
and are these transparent?  (viii) Are the duties and responsibilities of the security services 
enshrined in legal statutes, military law, and codes of conduct? 
5.2.  Other Aspects of Governance 
The security sector is particularly vulnerable to corruption, not least because of its culture of 
secrecy which leads to limited transparency and reluctance to allow civilian and external 
oversight.  The difficulties of measuring and assessing performance further increase 
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and Shavell, 2005).  Corruption is all the more problematic in the security sector because the 
sector typically is expected to play a major role (of deterrence and prosecution) in the fight 
against corruption. 
In addition to sound public financial management, other aspects of a good governance 
system include (see Figure 4):
16 
•  Political oversight and accountability: including by Parliament (discussed above). 
•  Civil society oversight (see also the previous section): it is important to give 
sufficient access to information (on policy choices and on actual implementation) to 
various groups in civil society (media, groups of experts in academia, private sector, 
other members of the public). 
•  Interface with the private sector: whenever possible, the private sector should be 
given a role in oversight and providing checks with respect to the security sector.  
For instance, the private sector can be appropriately involved in oversight of public 
procurement for the security sector to ensure good governance and value for money.  
Justice and police are a key driver of the investment climate, and the private sector 
should have opportunities to voice its concerns in a constructive manner. 
•  Public sector management: in addition to public financial management (see 
previous section), good public sector management requires several elements.  First is 
civil oversight in the security sector ministries (as well as, in the area of PFM, in the 
Ministry of Finance) and through the President’s Office or National Security 
Council.  This has to be complemented by strong, effective, and ethical leadership 
(which itself can be complemented by some technical measures, including asset 
declaration, ethical norms or codes of conduct for personnel in the security sector, 
etc.).  Second, personnel management is critical for the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
the sector.  Experience in the civil service underlines the importance of merit-based 
processes, ethnic diversity, and avoiding patronage and its adverse impact.  An 
important issue, which relates to corruption, is the salary level of personnel in the 
armed forces and in the judiciary, which needs to be sufficiently attractive while 
remaining fiscally affordable and not distorting the labor market.  Third, good public 
sector management requires effective coordination among agencies.  This is often linked 
to ethnic issues, particularly if various institutions are dominated by different ethnic 
or political groups, as in the case of Afghanistan, Palestine, and often Lebanon.   
•  Decentralization and local participation (this was discussed in Section 4, showing 
some potential but important limits to this factor for the security sector). 
•  Cutting across these issues is the role of the international community, 
reviewed in Box 2.  
                                                 
16 Some of the elements discussed here are reviewed on the World Bank website on “Law and Justice Institutions”:  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,menuPK:1974074~pagePK:149018
~piPK:149093~theSitePK:1974062,00.html.  
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The Afghanistan Public Finance Management Review included a substantial analysis of 
public expenditures and their management in the security sector (see World Bank, 2005b, 
Volume V).   This work, carried out jointly with the UK Department for International 
Development, responded to a request from Afghanistan’s Ministry of Finance to include the 
security sector within the scope of the Review.  It provides an illustration of how many of 
the themes, principles, and methods discussed earlier in this paper can be applied to analysis 
as well as institutional and policy recommendations for improving public financial 
management in the security sector of a specific conflict-affected country. 
The analysis starts from an institutional definition of the security sector.  The main security 
institutions in Afghanistan include: (i) government security management and oversight 
bodies: National Security Council and National Security Advisor, Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, and the Auditor General’s Office; (ii) security 
services: Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), National Border 
Guards, Counter-Narcotics forces, National Directorate of Security (responsible for 
intelligence), Customs General Directorate under the Ministry of Finance, remnants of 
earlier military and police forces—the former subjected to a program of Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); and (iii) justice and legal institutions: Supreme 
Court, Judiciary, Attorney General’s Office and prosecutorial offices (saranwal). 
Nearly a quarter-century of protracted conflict in Afghanistan, starting in the late 1970s, led 
to pervasive insecurity and destroyed or profoundly damaged the institutions that had been 
responsible for providing security in the pre-war period—both formal governmental 
institutions and traditional mechanisms.  Government security forces were misused in ways 
that reduced rather than enhanced security, e.g. during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, 
and they became increasingly “captured” by factions in Afghanistan’s civil war during the 
1990s.  The emergence of numerous well-armed militia groups, in shifting loose alliances, 
meant that the ability to use large-scale violence in pursuit of objectives was no longer the 
monopoly of the government but rather was widely contested, greatly undermining security 
(see Section 2 and Figure 2).  The judicial system was similarly undermined, and traditional 
mechanisms for providing justice were often captured and used for their own ends by 
commanders and warlords.  Women suffered greatly from the conflict as a result of violence 
against them, and also due to limited mobility and lack of access to education and health 
services, culminating in the Taliban’s severe social restrictions.  Neighboring countries and 
other powers repeatedly and competitively intervened militarily—either directly or indirectly 
by providing arms and other support to different factions—contributing in a major way to 
insecurity in Afghanistan.  In sum, the long period of conflict and insecurity had profoundly 
damaging economic, social, and political consequences for the country and its people. 
The critical importance of enhancing security and reforming the security sector in 
Afghanistan has been widely recognized.  This was signaled in the Bonn Agreement, which 
provided for the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and 
two subsequent donor meetings on security set targets and assigned donor responsibilities.  
                                                 
17 This section of the paper is based on World Bank (2005b), especially Volume V.  The fiscal 
sustainability of main security sector expenditure has been further analyzed with updated information in 
Byrd et al (2008); also see Manthri (2008). 
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certain respects reforming the security sector.  Successes included most generally the steady 
shift away from a pattern of endemic factional and ethnic conflict, the gradual extension of 
the writ of the national government beyond Kabul, the formation and gradual build-up of 
the Afghan National Army, and implementation of the DDR process.  However, great gaps 
remained both in terms of areas that the Bonn Agreement did not cover and in achieving 
agreed security-related targets.  Moreover, international security forces’ presence in 
Afghanistan was initially very modest and limited as compared to other post-conflict 
situations.  In 2005 and especially during 2006 the security situation deteriorated with the 
resurgence of the Taliban insurgency in the south. This deterioration has continued in 2007 
and 2008, with the insurgency spreading to new areas. 
6.1.  Salient Features and Key Issues 
Salient features of Afghanistan’s security sector at present include the following: 
•  The historical legacy of conflict was fragmentation into regional and local 
militias, capture of policing and military functions by non-legitimate actors, 
and erosion of both formal and traditional justice systems, also with capture by 
non-legitimate actors.  Building the state since late 2001 has entailed reconstituting 
and reforming the security forces under legitimate oversight by the civil authorities. 
•  Security threats faced by Afghanistan are variegated and disputed by different 
stakeholders.  Some observers see the continuing and expanding insurgency in the 
south and east and conflict with Taliban/Al Qaeda forces as the most important 
security issue.  Others are most concerned about criminality and lack of rule of law at 
the local level.  Still others are concerned about the limited management capacity of 
civil authorities and inadequate oversight/accountability of security forces.  The drug 
industry is widely seen as a major cause and consequence of insecurity. 
•  The overall size of Afghanistan’s security sector, even with recent and 
planned expansion, does not seem unreasonably large by international 
standards.  The planned size of the ANA was set at 70,000, subsequently increased 
to 80,000, and most recently a sharp further increase to 122,000 (plus 12,000 in 
training pool) has been targeted.  The planned size of the Afghan National Police 
(ANP) was 62,000, later augmented by some 11,000 auxiliary police, and 
subsequently expanded to an overall ANP force ceiling of 82,000, with a further 
increase under consideration. 
•  Nevertheless the security sector is costly and most likely unaffordable.  Over 
the medium term, it is extremely doubtful whether the sustaining costs of 
Afghanistan’s security sector at planned force levels can be absorbed by 
Afghanistan’s national budget.  This was an important finding in World Bank (2005b, 
Volume V), and subsequently the fiscal cost of the security sector has further 
escalated due to substantial increases in force sizes as well as salary increases and 
growth of other costs. 
•  Progress in developing different parts of the security sector has been uneven.  
After a slow start initially, the formation and expansion of the ANA have moved 
forward rapidly.  Progress in developing and improving the ANP has been much 
slower, and reform and capacity building in the justice sector have lagged far behind. 
   27•  Security and fiscal issues are closely interlinked (see Section 3.1).  For example, 
low domestic revenue is both a consequence and a cause of insecurity.  Costs of 
reconstruction tend to be higher due to insecurity, while the security sector is a 
source of considerable fiscal pressure.  Pay and grading decisions with respect to the 
security services, made outside national budget processes, have important direct 
fiscal implications and secondary consequences through pressures on civilian pay. 
Trends in security sector expenditures, including both Core Budget (spending included in 
budget documents and going through Treasury channels) and External Budget (spending 
directly executed by donors and their contractors), illustrate some of these points (Table 4). 
Table 4: Security Sector Expenditures by Program (US $ million) 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Estimate Estimate Budget 
Total         1,105         1,328         1,615 
Afghan National Army             797             788              830 
National Police and Law Enforcement            209             340             597 
Justice              16               45               63 
Mine Action               63               96               77 
DDR                21               59               48 
 
Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance budget documents and fiscal reports; authors’ estimates. 
 
From the perspective of this paper, key challenges facing Afghanistan’s security sector 
include the following: 
•  The role of policy-based budgeting (see Section 5.1; these points are reviewed in 
more detail in Section 6.3).  First, an integrated security sector strategy and policy 
framework is needed; otherwise sound programmatic—e.g. on force sizes, 
equipment—and public expenditure decisions cannot be made.  So far the National 
Security Strategy has not yet been finalized, although reportedly its preparation is at 
an advanced stage.  Second, very high donor-executed spending through the external 
budget renders achieving coherence of spending across and within subsectors much 
more difficult, and also raises questions about the fiscal sustainability of the security 
sector in the medium term.  Third, there are many difficulties in coordinating and 
prioritizing security sector expenditures and actions, reflecting the above problems 
and fragmentation of decision-making across donors.  These factors make it more 
difficult for the National Security Council (NSC) to fully carry out its mandated 
strategic, leadership, and coordination functions, although the situation in this regard 
improved in 2004 and 2005.  
•  Concerns about the growing security sector wage bill and pressures for 
fiscally unaffordable salary increases, as well as the fiscal sustainability of 
security sector staffing levels.  The ANA salary structure, determined without 
reference to fiscal constraints or pay in the civil service, set a fiscally costly precedent 
which also resulted in a large pay increase for the police, and which other sectors 
aspired to (this point is discussed in more detail in the next section).  Subsequent 
further increases in ANA salaries have exacerbated such pressures and tendencies. 
•  The role of good governance (discussed in Section 5.2).  Public administration 
reforms and capacity building in security sector management and oversight 
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forces like the ANA.  This imbalance, as well as the lack of progress in some security 
subsectors (e.g. justice), carries serious risks.  It is essential to develop good 
governance and sound and sustainable financial management practices throughout 
the security sector, in line with and integrated with national budget processes and 
fiduciary provisions. 
6.2.  Toward a Fiscally Sustainable Security Sector 
Decisions on and investments in force levels, salaries, non-salary staff-related costs, 
standards of equipment, base construction, etc. in the security sector are leading to a fiscally 
unsustainable situation—for the security sector itself and for Afghanistan’s budget as a 
whole.  Figure 7 below illustrates the dilemma that for some years to come, planned/forecast 
levels of security sector expenditures will exceed likely domestic revenues, under a somewhat 
ambitious yet reasonable “base case” of revenue mobilization and even more under a “low 
case”.  These expenditure forecasts are conservative and based on earlier targeted ANA and 
ANP sizes, and do not include any provision for further rises in wages or increases in other 
costs.  And in any case, allocating the bulk of domestic revenues to the security sector is not 
viable or desirable over the medium term. 
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Revenues - Base Case Revenues - Low Case
Source: World Bank (2005b, Volume V, Chapter 4). 
This situation, which stems from the large (albeit of uncertain duration) availability of 
external resources outside the Government Core Budget (i.e. in the External Budget), 
fragmented decision-making and lack of cost-consciousness, difficulties faced by the 
Government in exercising strategic coordination of security sector spending, and limitations 
on oversight by entities like the Ministry of Finance, urgently needs to be addressed.  A 
recommended set of near-term actions includes the following: 
•  Greatly enhance the information base on security sector expenditures, 
especially the cost implications of planned expansion of security forces, and also of 
associated wage structures and non-wage recurrent expenditure requirements. 
•  Review the fiscal implications of ongoing security sector expansion and 
reforms.  The Government should conduct an integrated security sector-wide fiscal 
review to forecast the fiscal implications of currently programmed security sector 
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overall umbrella of the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) into which it 
would feed.  The sustainability of planned expenditures needs to be assessed within 
the context of the overall rolling fiscal plan, growth of domestic revenues, and 
possible medium-term commitments from donors to fund recurrent costs. 
•  Revisit strategic objectives and trade-offs in light of fiscal constraints.  This 
could be done as part of finalizing the National Security Strategy (see Section 6.3). 
•  Take actions to improve the situation.  These could include (i) containing further 
security sector wage increases; (ii) reviewing programmed force sizes, especially for 
the ANA, in light of fiscal constraints; (iii) exploring possibilities for containing non-
salary recurrent costs while not adversely affecting readiness and operational 
capabilities; and (iv) similarly reviewing construction plans and equipment costs. 
•  Any changes in security sector expenditures resulting from unforeseen 
developments in the security situation and requirements should occur 
through the budget process  (including a revised budget during the financial year if 
necessary), not in an ad-hoc manner. 
•  Explore with donors prospects for predictable medium-term external funding 
for the security sector, in line with agreed security sector objectives and a clear 
road-map for eventually phasing out such funding over a number of years as 
Afghanistan progresses toward a sustainable fiscal position and security improves. 
•  Ensure that the fiscal sustainability “lens” is applied to future decisions on 
the security sector, with a view to preventing decisions or actions from worsening 
the fiscal situation of the security sector.  
6.3.  Strategic Prioritization and Sequencing 
As can be seen from Figure 8 below, security sector expenditures have been dominated by 
Defense (primarily ANA) and Interior (mainly police), which together account for close to 
90% of the total.  Counter-narcotics expenditures have been variable and in part may be 
double-counted with other spending inside and outside the security sector (hence they are 
not shown in Figure 8), but they also have become quite large.  The low spending on the 
justice sector is striking and is reflective of the lack of progress until recently on 
improvements and reforms in the justice system.  The national police also was underfunded 
in the initial years after 2001, although this was subsequently corrected, primarily through 
large External Budget expenditures.  Thus the overall allocation of security sector 
expenditures seems to have been somewhat disconnected from the concerns voiced by large 
numbers of Afghans about security and crime. 
 














Source: Afghanistan Ministry of Finance budget documents and fiscal reports; authors’ estimates. 
 
As for the national budget as a whole, there are no easy answers or technical fixes for 
allocating public spending, either between security and other sectors or within the security 
sector.  Clearly, the very large share of security spending in the External Budget (nearly 80% 
in 2004/05), and fragmented donor decisionmaking on expenditures, make the task of the 
National Security Council, the Ministry of Finance, and other oversight bodies especially 
difficult.  Some points with respect to intersectoral and intrasectoral prioritization are 
outlined below (see World Bank, 2005b, Volume I, Chapter 5 for further discussion). 
Prioritization across sectors:  Sophisticated technical approaches may require substantial 
resources and even so are highly imperfect and can result in misleading conclusions.  Simpler 
rules of thumb may work better, and judgment is called for. 
•  Intersectoral allocation decisions need to be anchored in the overall national security 
strategy and national development strategy. 
•  Identifying and mitigating gross anomalies in intersectoral allocations is very 
important (e.g. the serious underfunding of the justice sector, noted earlier). 
•  International patterns of spending and outcomes (for example for police) may 
provide some guidance on where funds should be allocated (see Section 3.2). 
•  Identifying bottlenecks and directing expenditures to alleviate them may be a useful 
approach in the short run. 
•  Some linkage between sectoral allocations and performance may make sense but 
needs to be watched carefully, and corrective actions taken if required, to ensure that 
large imbalances between sectors do not emerge over time. 
•  Finally, it is essential that intersectoral prioritization be comprehensive—no sector 
(e.g. Defense) should be considered sacrosanct or immune from scrutiny. 
Prioritization within sectors:  Technically, prioritization within sectors is more manageable 
than intersectoral prioritization because the alternatives tend to be more comparable. 
•  Intrasectoral allocation decisions need to be anchored in a sound sector strategy. 
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project proposals and also to make more general prioritization decisions. 
•  Ruthless culling of projects with lower benefits and/or which do not have good 
prospects for rapid completion will improve the timeliness, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of sector programs. 
•  Complementarities need to be factored into prioritization decisions (e.g. there is no 
point in having a police force that is not adequately armed, clothed, equipped, and 
provided with vehicles and fuel). 
•  Correcting geographical and other disparities (for example in terms of police 
coverage) may help guide prioritization. 
6.4.  Budget Execution for Effective and Efficient Utilization of Funds 
Effective and efficient utilization of funds to achieve stipulated purposes is a key element of 
the PFM system, including in the security sector.  As we have argued, a general principle is 
that all elements of a sound budget execution process should be applied to the security 
sector, in the same way as to the rest of the budget.  Security expenditures in Afghanistan’s 
Core Budget are essentially subject to similar control mechanisms, accounting and reporting 
requirements, and procurement arrangements as in the rest of the Core Budget.  The main 
difference is the absence of a strong internal audit function—a role that in the case of the 
civilian budget is to a large extent played by the Monitoring Agent of the ARTF (see World 
Bank, 2005b, Volume I, Box 6.2).  The absence of such a mechanism—albeit extraordinary 
and temporary—in the security sector means that there is a weaker control framework 
despite the application of other elements of the Core Budget execution process.  
Security spending in the External Budget occurs completely outside these Government 
processes.  This carries serious disadvantages with respect to the quality and consistency of 
information flows, and also procurement.  Another major problem has been the variety of 
salary levels, payment channels, and top-up arrangements in the security sector, which risk 
fragmenting the accountability and loyalties of security sector staff.  The shift of ANA salary 
payments and food expenditures for the ANA onto the Core Budget represented a major 
improvement in this regard. 
With respect to procurement, it is possible to follow sound procurement procedures despite 
the actual or perceived obstacles in defense or other security sectors, and good procurement 
practices will reduce vulnerability to corruption (see Section 5.1).  In particular, competitive 
procurement with adequate transparency and oversight is critical.  With the recent passage of 
a new Procurement Law that meets international standards, donors funding security through 
the External Budget should move toward using sound internationally acceptable 
procurement procedures, either those provided for in Afghanistan’s Procurement Law or 
similar procedures.  This is also important in the case of procurement of supplies, security 
services, etc. by international military forces in Afghanistan. 
There is also a rather formidable agenda for generating and effectively utilizing monitoring 
information (Section 3.3).  This can start with small steps and make progress incrementally 
over time.  One promising option is to generate and regularly monitor basic financial data on 
on security sector expenditures in the Core Budget, and encourage donor partners to provide 
similar information on as consistent a basis as possible for External Budget expenditures in 
the security sector.  Staffing data, which have suffered from inconsistencies, need to be 
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numbers or proportions of staff on duty and available to carry out their responsibilities.  
Subsequently, simple indicators of output/performance could be compiled and used in 
monitoring.  It is more important to collect and effectively utilize simple information than to 
devise highly sophisticated data and monitoring systems which are difficult to implement 
and become a burden on scarce Government capacity.  Finally, the institutions concerned 
need to take on the role of monitoring and evaluation and treat it as a serious part of their 
work, and to make meaningful use of performance indicators in decision making. 
To illustrate how straightforward monitoring of basic financial data can provide meaningful 
insights and feedback for resource allocation and other budgetary decision-making, Table 5 
compares estimated actual expenditures with budget targets for various categories of security 
sector expenditures in 2003/04 and 2004/05.  Key points that emerge include the following: 
•  There were sizable deviations between budgeted and estimated actual spending for 
most categories of security expenditures and also major fluctuations over time, 
suggesting that there is still a long way to go before the budget becomes a reasonably 
good predictor of actual expenditures.  
•  Within the security sector, External Budget expenditures are substantially higher in 
relation to budget targets than are Core Budget expenditures. 
•  Defense expenditures tended to perform better in relation to budget targets than 
other parts of the security sector, especially in 2004/05. 
•  Comparing the security sector with the budget as a whole (see World Bank, 2005b, 
Volume II, Part 1, Table 1.1), it is clear that the security sector achieved considerably 
higher expenditures in relation to budget targets than did the overall budget. 














Total            812          1,105             136          1,510          1,328               88 
Core            193             235             122             355             292               82 
   Operating             193              233              121              255              275              108 
   Development               -                    2                -                  99                17                17 
External            619             870             140          1,155          1,036               90 
Defense             563              797              141              790              788              100 
Interior             143              209              146              498              340                68 
Justice               13                16              125                61                45                74 
Other               93                84                91              161              155                96 
2003/04 2004/05
(US $ million) (US $ million)
 
Source: Ministry of Finance budget documents and fiscal reports, staff estimates. 
These observations suggest that the security sector as a whole (in relation to the rest of the 
budget), and within the security sector the External Budget and Defense, were better 
“protected” in terms of expenditures in relation to budget targets. 
6.5.  Summary of Recommendations 
The most important message emerging from this analysis of expenditures and public 
financial management in Afghanistan’s security sector is that the security sector needs to be 
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programming (MTFF), annual budget formulation, staffing and payroll management, 
financial management and controls, and external scrutiny, among others.  There is no 
justification for treating the security sector as separate or sacrosanct, and not subjecting it to 
budgetary and fiduciary processes.  Specific recommendations include the following. 
Review the Fiscal Implications of Ongoing Security Sector Reforms:  Enhance the 
information base on security sector expenditures, and conduct an integrated security sector-
wide fiscal review to forecast fiscal implications of security sector development and reforms 
over the medium- and longer-term.  This would serve as a basis for considering security 
sector force levels, and for discussions with donors on longer-term financing.  It would also 
facilitate policy- and program-based budgeting of security sector expenditures with a 
medium-term perspective. 
Further Develop Policy Making Capacity in the NSC and Finalize the National 
Security Strategy:  The National Security Advisor and NSC are tasked with coordinating 
policy development and overseeing integrated strategic planning across security institutions.  
Adequate capacity is required for these purposes.  An integrated security sector strategy and 
policy is needed to determine acceptable longer-term costs of security institutions and 
appropriately prioritize and sequence spending across and within subsectors (e.g. justice and 
police versus ANA).  The Government of Afghanistan should finalize the National Security 
Strategy, and it will need to gain wide buy-in within and outside of the Government. 
Treat Security as an Integral Part of the National Development Strategy:  The recently 
completed Afghanistan National Development Strategy can be used as an opportunity to 
ensure that the security sector both is accorded its due importance as a development issue 
for Afghanistan and that the broader developmental and fiscal perspective is injected into 
the security sector strategy. 
Implement Administrative Reforms and Develop Security Sector Management and 
Oversight Capacity:  Reforms are needed to enhance human resource capabilities in the 
Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, Counter Narcotics, and in the National Security 
Directorate.  A particular priority is developing solid financial management capacity and 
practices in these line ministries, including strengthening the control framework, notably 
with the development of internal audit.  
Rigorously Enforce Staffing Size, and Set Salary Increases Taking into Account 
Fiscal Absorption Capacity:  It is vital that agreed formal staffing establishment sizes be 
enforced.  Moreover salaries, like non-salary costs, must be subject to the normal rigors of 
public expenditure management and fiscal discipline—the security sector wage bill must 
remain affordable. 
Role of donors:  Donors play an even greater role in Afghanistan’s security sector than they 
do in other sectors.  Consequently they are also important in public financial management in 
the security sector.  Whereas donor practices inadvertently can hinder the Government’s 
efforts to make the national budget the central instrument of policy, reform, and resource 
allocation for the security sector, donors can also make a major contribution to 
improvements in this regard.  Specifically, donors can contribute to improving public finance 
management in Afghanistan’s security sector by: (i) supporting finalization of an agreed 
National Security Strategy and corresponding strategies and policies for the individual 
sectors; (ii) reassessing views about force sizes and cost requirements in the light of fiscal 
constraints; (iii) helping enhance the capacity of oversight actors (such as the Auditor 
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to financial management in the security sector; (iv) channeling more of their assistance to the 
security sector through the Core Budget; (v) for resources not channeled through the Core 
Budget, ensuring that timely and accurate information is made available to the budget 
authorities, and maximizing use of internationally acceptable procedures e.g. for 
procurement; (v) helping key security ministries strengthen their budget formulation and 
budget execution processes; and (vi) discussing medium- and longer-term availability of 
external resources for the security sector. 
Implementing these recommendations and other initiatives to improve security in 
Afghanistan, which is a necessary condition for the country’s development, undoubtedly will 
take time, particularly in view of the intensifying conflict.  However, there is a need to get a 
handle on the fiscal sustainability issues in the security sector, as there is a risk that decisions 
on force levels, pay, non-salary spending, equipment, construction, etc. that are being made 
or implemented today will be unaffordable for Afghanistan in the future.  Dialogue with 
donors, including on predictable medium-term financial support to Afghanistan’s security 
sector, also is urgently needed. 
7. Conclusions and Entry Points for a Two-Way Dialogue 
Security and development are intimately related, as is recognized in a growing body of 
literature and increasingly by key development actors.  In this paper, we have argued that 
understanding security-related risks and designing risk mitigation strategies are crucial for 
achieving better development outcomes in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and welfare 
in developing countries.  To this end, a number of economic tools can be brought to bear to 
complement traditional approaches to assessment of security issues and risks.  Among these 
tools, we have focused on those related to public finance management, service delivery, and 
governance, because of the positive experience with these tools in other sectors as well as 
their applicability to the security sector.  A key lesson is that in almost all cases traditional 
tools and principles can and should be applied to the security sector (with appropriate—but 
not excessive—scope for adjustments in view of confidentiality considerations). 
Public finance has important linkages to security (as shown in this paper) and to economic 
growth and development (as has been widely recognized in the economic literature).  The 
security sector will function better, and in a more sustainable manner, if good PFM 
principles are applied in the security sector.  This linkage also works through the impact of 
sound public finances on the economy and thereby indirectly on security.  On the other 
hand, better security can also support improvements in public finances, most notably 
through enabling increased revenue mobilization, which in turn can provide fiscal space to 
spend more on the security sector, and so on.  Breaking out of an “informal equilibrium” 
where insecurity and weak public finances (as well as poor governance, lack of capacity, etc.) 
reinforce each other, and moving toward a “virtuous circle” whereby improvements in these 
areas become mutually reinforcing, is critical in insecure, low-capacity, often conflict-affected 
countries like Afghanistan. 
Using economic tools effectively in the analysis of security issues and of the nexus between 
security, development, and public finances—and for developing and reaching consensus on 
concrete, practical policy recommendations—will require a two-way dialogue.  Ministries of 
Finance, civil society, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions, which are 
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benefits of doing so have been demonstrated in the Afghanistan case just discussed.  It is 
important that the application of economic tools not be mechanical but rather 
contextualized in the light of country circumstances, including based on adequate knowledge 
of a country’s security sector characteristics and its budget system. 
From the other side, actors directly involved in the security sector should familiarize 
themselves with these tools and associated PFM, service delivery, and governance themes to 
facilitate productive dialogue.  Such actors can help provide the contextual information and 
knowledge on the security sector that will enable the application of PFM analysis and other 
economic tools to be fruitful. 
Possible entry points for such a dialogue between development/public finance management 
entities and security sector institutions include the following: 
•  Policy integration.  Emphasize that security is a key factor for development, for 
instance by including an MDG goal dedicated to security (as in Afghanistan) or 
integrating security in the poverty reduction strategy (see World Bank, 2005c).  And 
view development as a longer-term driver of improved security (see Box 2).  Policy 
integration can be encouraged through analytical work at the country level 
establishing the importance of these linkages, and by holding development and 
policy forums with sessions on these subjects that include both sets of actors as 
participants.  
•  Fiscal issues.  Integrate the security sector in the dialogue and frameworks for fiscal 
issues—both short-run fiscal management and longer-term fiscal adjustment as well 
as fiscal sustainability considerations.  Fiscal linkages are particularly important to 
Ministries of Finance, which can be persuaded of the importance of these linkages 
and to take them up in their dialogue with the line agencies concerned.  In donor 
countries as well, issues of fiscal sustainability are important for Finance Ministries. 
•  Public finance approach.  Bring to bear the key lessons learned in public finance 
management (on sustainability, allocative efficiency, transparency, etc.) and service 
delivery (decentralization, accountability, etc.) and their implications for the security 
sector.  Security sector actors are interested in whether and how their expenditure 
demands can be met, which provides a possible entry point for bringing them into 
the dialogue. 
•  Policy and implementation coordination.  Develop institutional mechanisms to 
enhance the integration of the security sector with the rest of the development 
strategy and national budget (at policy and implementation levels).  Appropriate 
institutional mechanisms are needed to bring together domestic actors (possibly 
through establishing and strengthening a National Security Council; emphasizing the 
need for transparency), international actors (coordination between multilaterals—e.g. 
international financial institutions and the UN system, coordination within 
bilaterals—development arms and foreign affairs and defense arms), and between 
them (through consultative groups, Poverty Reduction Strategy mechanisms, etc.). 
•  Skills.  All this requires development of more diverse skills in the various institutions 
to allow a common language and productive dialogue.  Considerable skill 
development can occur through learning by doing on both sides, which can be 
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This will require some resources, including notably the time of concerned staff. 
Much more remains to be done in terms of data collection and research, which can fruitfully 
shed light on the issues.  In the meantime, however, it is hoped that these possible entry 
points, together with the example of this framework applied to the case of Afghanistan, will 
provide a meaningful basis for (i) initiating a productive dialogue between security and 
development / public finance actors, (ii) exploring further the lessons from experience, and 
(iii) together coming up with recommendations for improving policies, processes, and 
institutions that will make a difference. 
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